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ON THE THEORY OF IMPLIED CONTRACTS.The object of the present article is to ascertain whai, in the technical language of English law, is meant by the expression "implied
promise," or "promise in law," and to show that in the great
majority of cases these expressions do not dnote a genuine, but
a fictitious promise. The writer has also endeavored to set forth
the reasons which gave rise to the fiction in question, and also to
the fiction of implied requests, which is inseparable from it. In
order to render what follows more clear and intelligible, it is proposed in the first place, to draw the attention of the reader to the
true nature of a genuine agreement.
1. AGREEMENTS.

An agreement is the mutual and deliberate consent of several
persons, that something shall be done or forborne. If the agreement arises from a deliberate offer by one party, and a simple
acceptance thereof by another party, the agreement is termed a
promise, and its effect is to impose an obligation on the offerer (called
the promisor), and a right correlative thereto on the acceptor (called
the promisee). If the agreement consists of mutual promises, i. e.
From the London Law Magazine, for February, 1856, p. 27.
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of offers made by each party and accepted by the other, the agreement is termed a pact or convention, or simply an agreement, and
its effect is to impose obligations on each promisor, with correlative
rights on each promisee.
By a contract is meant, an agreement which is recognized as binding in a judicial, as opposed to a moral or religious point of view.
A contract, therefore, like an agreement, may consist of one promise or of several mutual promises ; but in every case the effect of
a contract is the creation of one or more obligations, enforceable
actively or passively in a court of civil jurisdiction.
The binding power of an agreement is entirely dependent on the
consent of the parties to it ; not only, be it observed, on the consent
of one of the parties, but on the mutual consent of both, viz. : of
the person making the proffer and of the person accepting it. An
unaccepted proffer (pollicitation),imposes no obligation on the party
making it, either in a moral or a judicial point of view. The reason
,of this is sufficiently obvious; agreements are held obligatory, in
consequence of the manifest injustice in disappointing expectations
deliberately raised ; but if an offer be not accepted, no expectation
can be regarded as raised, and no injustice is committed if the offer
be not carried into execution. Hence in all systems of jurisprudence,
it is held that an unaccepted offer may be retracted, and any excepStions to this rule are universally considered anomalous.' Consent
is the essence of every agreement, and is formed of the intention
signified by the promisor, and of the corresponding expectation
signified by the promisee. This intention with this expectation, is
styled the consensus of the parties; because the intention and
expectation chime or go together, or because they are directed to a
common object; namely, the acts or forbearances which form the
object of the agreement.2 Consent is in jurisprudence as essential
to every contract as it is in morals to every agreement, and consequently there cannot be any contract in the proper sense of the
term, where the promisor or promisee is, juridically speaking, incapaI Pothier, Oblig. No. 4; 1 Molitor des Oblig. en Droit Rom. p. 88, 262 Grot. de
Bell. et Pao. i. c. 11, .16; Puchta Pandekten, 251, 259; Thibaut, System, 570;
Payne vs. Cave, 3 T. R. 148; Routledge vs. Grant, 4 Bing. 653.
See Austin's Prey. of Jur. 359, note.
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ble of giving consent, or being capable and consenting, does not
signify his consent in the manner required by law.
2. CONTRACTS EXPRESS AND IMPLIED (IN THE SENSE OF TACIT).

According as the consent of the parties to a contract is signified
directly by some expression of will, or indirectly, so that it can only
be gathered from attendant circumstances, is the contract said to beexpress or tacit. This division-of contracts has reference entirely
to the mode of proof, and not to any difference in the nature of*
agreements. A tacit agreement is as much a genuine agreement, as.
one which is expressed. Consent, in the sense already explained,
is as essential to the one as to the other ; and such consent being.
present and signified, the agreement is complete. This is illustrated
by Mr. Austin,' with his usual clearness and accuracy: he says:"The promisor signifies to the promisee, that he intends to do the
acts, or to observe the" forbearances, which form the object of his.
promise. If he signifies this his intention by spoken or written
words (or by signs which custom or usage has rendered equivalent.
to words), his proffered promise is express. If he signifies this his.
intention by signs of another nature, his proffered promise is still a.
genuine promise, but is implied or tacit. If, for example, I receive
goods from a shopkeeper, telling him that I mean to pay for them,
I promise expressly to pay for the goods which I receive; for I
signify an intention to pay for them, through spoken or written
language. Again : having been accustomed to receive goods from
the shopkeeper, and also to pay for the goods which I have been
accustomed to receive, I receive goods which the shopkeeper delivers.
at my house, without signifying by words spoken or written (or bysigns which custom or usage has rendered equivalent to words), any'
intention or purpose of paying.for the goods which he delivers.
Consequently I do not promise expressly to pay for the particulargoods. I promise, however, tacitly; for by receiving the particular goods, under the various circumstances which have preceded and!
accompany the reception, I signify to the party who delivers them,.
my intention of paying for the goods, as decidedly as I should.
signify it if I told him that I meant to pay. The only difference'

See Austin, ubi sup. 856, 357.
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between the express, and the tacit or implied promise, lies in the
natures of the signs through which the two intentions are respectively
signified or evinced."
Instances of genuine implied contracts exist, of course, in abundance. The following suffice for the purpose of illustration. The
drawer of a bill of exchange impliedly promises to pay it if the
-drawee does not.1 Where an express contract has been made for
the sale of goods, and goods are sent not according to the contract,
a promise to pay for them quantum valent is implied, if they are
retained.2 So, where an express contract is entered into, but is
invalid, a promise to pay for what has been actually done on the
faith of it, is properly implied.3 Where a person receives goods
under a bill of lading, and retains them, a promise on his part to
pay what may be due for their freight is implied.4 If a lessee,
with the consent of his landlord, remains in possession after the
expiration of the lease, a contract for a tenancy from year to year,
upon the terms of the lease, so far as they are applicable to such
a tenancy, is implied between the tenant and the landlord.5
In all these cases a genuine consent is present, and is, in fact,
. ignified, though not by express words. This consent, moreover,
.is no fictitious consent imputed by law, in spite of its non-existence
in point of fact, as may be seen at once by supposing dissent to be
signified. If I request a person to work for me, but say nothing as
.to payment, I tacitly agree to pay him for his services, and of course
.a mere mental reservation or unsignified intention on my part not
to pay for them cannot affect the question.
ly conduct, so far as
it can be taken into account by another, reasonably leads to an ex.pectation of payment, and I am not at liberty to defeat the expectation so reasonably raised by myself. De non existentibus et non
.apparentibuseadem eat ratio. But if there are circumstances, apparent, and rebutting the inference of any intention on my part to
pay, as if the person were accustomed to work for me for nothing,or if I stated, when I requested him to work, that he must not exI Starke vs. Cheeseman, 1 Ld. Raym. 538.
3Manor vs. Pyne, 3 Bing. 285.
6
Doe vs. Amey, 12 A. & E. 46.

2 Hart vs. Mills, 15 M. & W. 85.
4 Dougal vs. Kemble, I Bing. 888.
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pect to be paid, no intention to pay is imputed to me by a presurnytio juris et de jure, and no contract is implied by law against
the real facts of the case.' A tacit contract, in short, is not a fictitious but a genuine contract, which may be fairly inferred by a
proper application of the rules of evidence. There may even be a
genuine implied (i. e. tacit) contract, although dissent be expressed,
if, notwithstanding such dissent, the whole evidence, when -taken
together, warrants an inference of assent. Thus, where a person,
wishing to send fish by a railway, was told-by a notice served upon
him that fish would only be carried on certain terms, and he objected to those terms, but nevertheless sent the fish, the jury were
held properly to have found that he had in fact agreed to send his
fish upon the terms of the notice.2 It is to be observed that the
fish were not accepted upon his terms, or upon any terms other than
those mentioned in the notice; and although he objected to those
terms, the sending of the fish could only be looked upon as a waiver
of his objections: _Protestatiofacto contrarianon valet.
The above observations are, it is hoped, sufficient to show that
whether a genuine contract exists or not, is a mixed question of law
and fact, but that whether a contract is express or implied (i. e.
tacit) is a pure question of fact, and depends entirely on the evidence by which the existence of the contract is proved. As the
division of contracts into written and unwritfen is a division founded
only on their mode of proof, and does not turn on any difference in
the nature of that consent, which is the basis of all agreements, so
the division of contracts into express and implied (in the sense of
tacit) has no reference to that consent, but solely to the evidence
by which its existence is shown. It may, in truth, be said that the
division into express and implied (in the sense of tacit) is not appjlicable to contracts at all, but only to the facts by which they are
evidenced, and tallies, therefore, with the division of evidence into
direct and indirect.
See Moffatt vs. Laurie, 15 C. B. 583. Jewry vs. Busk, 5 Taunt. 302, was a
case of this description, and one in which, in spite of Lord [Sir James] Mansfield,
the jury clearly drew a wrong inference. [But the Court of Cqmmon Pleas agreed
with the jury.-ED. L. REG.]
2 Walker vs. The York and North Midland Railway Company, 2 E. & B. 750.
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3. OF FICTITIOUS PROMISES, OR PROMISES IN LAW.

We pass now to a wholly different source of obligations, and proceed to consider the nature of what are called obligations arising
quasi ex eontractu.
Quasi contracts (which together with genuine tacit contracts, are
usually called by English writers implied contracts) are not agreements at all. The consent without which no agreement can possibly
exist, is in those transactions called quasi contracts wholly absent.
Nevertheless, as will be hereafter shown, consent has been considered in our jurisprudence as essential, and has consequently been
imputed by a fiction.
The term quasi contract has been adopted from the Institutes of
Justinian. Speaking of obligations, it is laid down: Sequens divisio i4 quatuor species deducitur: aut enim ex contractu, aut quasi
ex eontractu; aut ex maleficio, aut quasi ex maleficio."'I Then in
another place, we find the nature of quasi contracts determined
_
thus : " Post
genera contractuum enumerata, despiciamus etiam de
ius obligationibus que oN proprie quidem EX CONTRACTU nasci
intelligentur, sed tamen QUIA 11ON EX MALEFICIO substantiam capiunt, QUASI EX CONTACTU nasci videntur."2 From this it appears
that a quasi contract is an event giving rise to an obligation, and is
characterized negatively ; first, by not possessing the essentials of
a contract; and, second, by not being unpermitted, and so falling
within the class of maleficia. By the old Roman law, contracts and
torts were regarded as the primary sources of obligations. Subsequently, other sources were also admitted, although they were neither contracts nor torts. Gaius3 says, " Obligationes aut ex eontrzctu naseunturaut ex malqficio, autproprioquodamjure ex variis
causarumfiguris." It is these last which are divided by Justinian
into quasi contracts and quasi torts. Both are distinguished from
genuine contracts and genuine torts by the absence of those characteristics which are essential to such contracts and .torts respectively; and each'is further distinguished from the other by beingthe first an event not unlawful, the second an event unlawful.
SInst. iii. tit. 13, 2.
2 lust. iii. tit. 273 Dig. mliv. tit. 7, de 0. et A. fr. 1, pr.
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M. Ortolan, in his excellent commentary on the Institutes, writes:
"The event which occasions an obligation gudsi ex contractu, contains no agreement; there is no mutual accord between the parties,
by virtue of which the obligation arises, and no contract in any
sense can be said to exist. On the other hand, the event is one
not juridically unpermitted, and cannot therefore be termed a tort
or a quasi tort."' The legal obligation quasi ez contractu arises
from the flagrant moral injustice which would otherwise be allowed
to be committed with impunity; it arises ex re, by the force of circumstances, utilitatis, equitatis causd.2 Hence it is that persons
who are altogether incapable of contracting, may, nevertheless, be
obliged quasi ex contractu: and this shows conclusively the absurdity
of the theory that consent, express or implied, is essential to such
an obligation. To say that a person has no sufficient will to bind
himself ex contractu, and yet that the same person can only be held
bound quasi ex contractu by virtue of a presumed exercise of will,
is to utter in the same breath two wholly inconsistent propositions.
And yet we find writers, both foreign and English, treating quasi
contracts as permitted transactions, which give rise to obligations
by virtue of a presumed consent. Having shown that such a theory
is not warranted by the corpus Juris, and that any consent in the
class of cases now under discussion has no existence in point of
fact, but is purely fictitious, we shall endeavor to discover the reasons which have led to the adoption of the fiction in our own system
of jurisprudence.
Previously to the Statute of Westminster 2, the only common
forms of action, 3 by which a right in personam could be enforced,
were covenant, debt, detinue, and trepass. Of these, trespass was
an action ex delicto, which did not in any case lie for a nonfeasance,
or eveni for a misfeasance, unless done vi et armis.. Debt only lay
to recover a liquidated sum of money, and not damages for a breach
of contract or other cause. Detinue lay for the recovery of a
12 Ortolan Explic. des Instit. lib. iiL tit. 27.
2 See Dig. xliv. tit. 7, de 0. et A. fr. 5, and 1 Molitor des Oblig. en Droit Rom. 7.
3 The writs of account annuity, conspiracy, and deceit, and the writs of assize,
&c., may be left out of consideration, without affecting the general accuracy of the
statements in the text.
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certain specific chattel, detained in breach of good faith, but was
not applicable to anything else; and covenant only lay in case
of a contract formally embodied in a deed. The Statute of Westminster 2, c. 24,1 introduced another class of actions inpersonam,
called generically actions on the case, aind characterized rather by
negative than by positive features. :No one of them was covenant,
or debt, or detinue, or trespass, and each 6f them was originally
unlike any other of them, inasmuch as the writ upon which each
was founded was framed with special reference to the circumstances
,peculiar to the occasion which led the applicant to seek redress.
The Masters in Chancery had, by the terms of the statute, ample
power to frame new writs upon the model of any of the writs previously established, and so to extend any of the old actions to cases
more or less like those to which they had been strictly confined.
This power was not, however, exercised to its full extent; for
during the first century after the passing of the Act the new actions
appear seldom to have been brought; and in nearly all of those
which are to be met with in the books the writs were framed in tort
on the model of the writ of trespass vi et armis.2 Not guilty was
the general issue, 3 and trespass on the case was the general name
of the class.' In the reign of Henry IV., actions on the case
became common, and it is in his reign that we first find traces of
actions of assumpsit as a distinct sub-class of actions on the case.
Actions founded on the non-performance of an express contract,
not under seal, were by no means favored by the judges of those
times.5 On two occasions actions were brought, in which the declaration alleged a promise (Quare cum, &c., assumpsisset, &c.) and a
breach; but the judges set their faces against the attempt, and
decided that the defendant, having been guilty of no misfeasance
See it in 2 Inst. 401.
See 3 Reeve, Hist. 89; Bro. Ab. Accion sur le Case.
Ebringtou vs. Doshant, 1 Lev. 142.
4 A century has not yet elapsed since actions on promises were commonly called
actions on the case. See Vigers vs. Aldrich, 4 Burr. 2483; Jacques vs. Withy, 1 T.
R. 557.
r See Bro. Ab. Accion sur le case, and the cases referred to in 1 Ashe's Promptuary, p. 11, 12.
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or malfeasance, was not liable at all.1 This naturally drove persons
aggrieved by the non-performance of a deliberate promise into the
Court of Chancery, 2 a course which seems to have induced the
common law judges to take a somewhat more liberal view of the
cases subsequently brought before them. The growing spirit of
liberality can be distinctly traced in the decisions pronounced
during the reigns of Henry VI. and Edward IV., and br6ught
together by Mr. Reeve in his History of English Law ;3 and in the
reign of Henry VII. it was finally settled that an action on th e
case for the non-performance of a promise would lie.4 The modern
action of assumpsit was thus at length introduced. There is, however, no trace as yet of an action of assumpsit based upon a fictitious contract. 5 Such an innovation could not be expected to be
made without opposition, or in the absence of the most urgent
necessity. The necessity is obvious, for the reader will have no
difficulty in imagining cases where a remedy ought certainly to exist,
and where, nevertheless, no satisfactory remedy was provided by any
of the original writs upon which actions at law were based.
Take, for example, the case of mbney paid by mistake in satisfaction of a debt erroneously supposed to be due. The money paid
ought clearly to be returned, but the means by which its return
could be compelled were by no means obvious or satisfactory.
Covenant was out of the question; trespass equally so; trover or
detinue would not lie, inasmuch as the ownership in the particular
coins paid had been transferred; account was doubtful and tedious;
debt presupposed a contract, 6 and even if it lay, the plaintiff was
liable to be defeated* by an unscrupulous wager of law, or by a
mistake as to the amount which ought to be returned.7 An action
on the case for a nonfeasance, in other words, an action of assumpsit, was the only satisfactory form of action left. But that had
not as yet been sustained, except where there was an actual
agreement between the parties. In the case sipposed, there is no
13 Reeves, Hist. Eng. Law, 245.
a 3 Reeve, 394.
4 4 Reeve, 171.

2

1 Spenee, Eq. Jur. 243.
6 3 Reeve, 396.

6 See the argument in Harris vs. De Bevoiee, 2 Ro. Rep. 440.
7 3 B1. Com. 155.
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agreement whatever for the return of the money; assumpsit, therefore, would not lie, and there was no remedy unless by a subpoena
out of Chancery. In this difficulty, a promise to return the money
was imputed by a fiction,1 and by means of this fiction the remedy
by assumpsit was made available. The fictitious promise was called
a promise in law, an implied promise. A denial by the defendant
that he made any promise in point of fact, was wholly useless; he
ought to return the money, and the fiction was necessary as a
means whereby to compel him so to do. The great advantages
which an action of assumpsit had over the action of debt, as well as
over every other form of action on the case, and the small departure
from established forms which the above fiction rendered necessary, are sufficient to account for its origin and subsequent rapid
-extension.
The fiction being established, it became customary to talk of
express contracts, and contracts implied by law, and to divide
contracts into express and implied-a division which, in the sense
in which the word implied is used, is inadmissible, if the word
contract is to retain any definite signification.
The fictitious
nature of implied promises was clearly seen by Lord Holt. In
Starke vs. Cheeseman, 1 Ld. Raym. 538, he is reported to have
said: "The notion of promises in law is a metaphysical notion, for
the law makes no promise but where there is a promise of the
party;" and in Anon. 6 Mod. 131, he says, "There is no such
thing as a promise in law." The meaning of this is, that a promise
in law, also called an implied promise, is not a genuine promise at
all. The circumstances which, as the phrase goes, raise a promise
in law, are indefinite in.number, and cannot be said to have more
characters in common than these; namely, first, the negative one
of absence of any genuine agreement, express or tacit; and,
second, the positive one of being such as on the .plainest principles
of morality give rise to an obligation which, in the opinion of
common law judges, ought to be enforceable at law, but which,
A similar fiction, "making a privily," was applied to actions of account, and
thence to actions of debt.
Dyer, 20 a.

See Finlason's Lead. Cases on Pleading, 79; Core's Ca.
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nevertheless, cannot be -properly enforced except by means of an
action in form ex contractu. According to Blackstone, contracts
implied by law are "such as reason and justice dictate, and which,
therefore, the law presumes that every man has contracted to
perform." 1 This passage, it must be admitted, is very unsatisfactory. Justice and reason dictate no contract in any case whatever;
such agreements as people choose to make are recognized, and are.
"in justice and reason" to be upheld or condemned, according to
their nature, and the circumstances under which they were made;
but where there is, in fact, no genuine agreement, either express or
tacit, no fictitious agreement is. dictated, either by justice or by
reason. Unsatisfactory, however, as the passage is, we have thence
authority for saying, that it is impossible accurately to determine,
by definition, the limits of the class of cases in which a fictitious
promise has been or will be imputed.
4.

OF IMPLIED REQUESTS.

The theory of implied requests is, in part, precisely similar to
that of implied promises, both as regards its origin and the purposes for which it was invented. In order to enforce certain clear
moral obligations, arising in the absence of any genuine agreement,
whether express or tacit, a promise to perform them was, as we
have seen, imputed by a fiction. To make this fiction of use in
those cases where that which was regarded as the consideration for
the fictitious promise was past and executed, it was further necessary, if there had been in fact no express or tacit request on the
part of the obligor, to suppose that what had been done by the
obligee had been done at the request of the former, to whom the
promise was imputed. It is, in general, both morally and otherwise,
very just and reasonable that a person shall not be permitted
unasked to do another a kindness, and then make him pay for it. 2
As a rule, no person is bound to pay for a benefit which he never
sought to obtain. On the other hand, morally it is very unjust,
13 BE.Com. 159;

Ib.162; and Comyn, Contr. 4.

2 Hunt vs. Bate, Dyer, 272 a; Galway vs. Mathew, 10 East, 264; Stokes vs. Lewis,

1 T. R. 20; Child vs. Morley, 8 T. R. 610.
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although in this country it has long been held legally just, that an
express promise to pay for an unsought benefit actually received
should be deemed invalid.' There are, however, cases where a
person is manifestly entitled to compensation for what he has done,
although he did not do it at the request, express or tacit, of the person
who ought to make the compensation. Thus, if one of two sureties
-pays the whole of a debt guaranteed by both, he clearly ought to
be indemnified by the other to the extent of one-half of the debt
paid. A fictitious promise to indemnify would not alone be sufficient; for the consideration for it is wholly past, and the person
paying (we will suppose) neither became surety, nor paid the debt
at the request, express or tacit, of his co-surety. To remedy this
Objection, a fictitious request is imputed, and then the fictitious
request, together with the payment, supports the fictitious promise
to indemnify. This promise, in its turn, serves as a foundation for
2
a declaration in assumpsit; and so justice is done.
Cases are also to be found where a fictitious request has been
imputed, in order to support an express promise. An express pro.
mise to pay for a benefit unsought, but actually obtained, has been
held invalid for want of a proper consideration. This monstrous
doctrine, however, has been softened down, by supposing the express
s
proniise to be evidence of a request preceding the benefit obtained.
This is manifestly not a legitimate inference. An express promise
to pay for what has been done, the evidence of an intention to confer a right on the promisee to require such payment, but is clearly
no evidence whatever that the promisor previously requested the
doing of what he has undertaken to pay for. Previously to the
promise, the promisor may have done nothing whatever to raise an
expectation of payment, and it is absurd to say that from the promise anything like a prior request can be legitimately inferred.
The doctrine relating to executed considerations) renders a fictitious
request as necessary where the promise is genuine, as where it is
itself fictitious. Speaking generally, the modern cases show that
I Hunt vs. Bate, Dyer, 272 a; Bull. N. P. 147 a.
2 Cowell vs. Edwards, 2 Bos. & P. 268.

3 See i Wins. Saund. 264 b.
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where there is an express promise, and the only consideration for it
is past and executed, that express promise is invalid, unless there
was in fact a previous request. Such is the general rule; and a
rule more fitted to favor gross breaches of faith, can hardly be conceived. The doctrine, however, is fortunately not without exception,
for there are cases where, in order to raise an obligation on the part
of the promisor, a previous request by him will be imputed by a fiction ;1 and there are others, as in the case of a promise to pay a
barred debt, where the promise is held binding in the absence df any
such fiction. It would seem that there is only one class of cases in
which a request will be imputed solely to support an express promise ; viz. cases like Wing vs. MiI, 1 B. & A. 104, where the plaintiff of his own accord did that which the defendant was legally compellable to do, and the defendant afterwards, in consideration
thereof, promised to pay. All the other cases in which a request is
imputed, will, on examination, be found to turn, not on the absence'
or presence of a genuine promise, but on the existence or non-existence of circumstances from which a promise will be imputed. If
the circumstances are such that a promise would be imputed, then,
if necessary, a previous request will likewise be imputed. For example, where the plaintift has been compelled to do that -which the
defendant ought legally himself to have done; or where the defendant has adopted and received the benefit of what the plaintiff, without being requested, did for him. In all such cases, whether there
be a genuine promise to pay or not, is immaterial. The genuine
promise, even if there be one, goes for nothing: in other words,
"where an executed consideration is one from which the law will
imply a promise, no express promise made in respect of that consideration can be enforced, if it differ from the promise which the
law would imply from the same consideration." 2
From what has preceded, it appears that the expression implied
promise, means sometimes a genuine but tacit promise, and sometimes, and more often, a promise which is wholly fictitious; and
See Chitty on Contracts, 4th ed. p. 62.
Smith on Contracts, 119, 2d ed.; Chitty on Contracts, 63, 4th ed.
Wins. Saund. 264 a, note a.

See, too, 1
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that this last meaning is that which also attaches to the expression
promise in law. The reasons which gave rise to and have preserved
these fictitious promises, have been traced to the disinclination of
the common law judges to depart from the old established forms
of pleading. The doctrine of implied requests, which is so closely
connected with that of implied promises, has been traced to the
necessity of escaping from the cruel consequences of a logical application of the rule which does not allow a permitted act, past and
gone, to give rise to an obligation on the part of one who did not
request its performance, or even to be sufficient to support a subsequent express promise by him. To say that, under such and such
circumstances, the law implies a promise, is, it is submitted, neither
more nor less than equivalent to saying that the circumstances supposed give rise to an obligation to compensate, and that such obligation can be enforced at law by an action in form ex contractu.
What those circumstances are it is not necessary now to examine.
There is one question,' however, which forces itself upon the attention, and which ought perhaps to be answered in this place, viz.,
what is the distinction between an obligation which gives rise to
what is called an implied promise, and any other obligation which
does not arise either from a genuine contract or from a tort? Without
discussing this question at length, the writer ventures to submit
that there is essentially none at all, unless it happen, as in some
2
cases it may, that one is relative and the other absolute.
N. L.
'Raised in Govett vs. Radnidge, 3 East, 70; Smith vs. White, 6 Bing. N. C. 218;
Pozzi vs. Shipton, 3 A. & E. 963; and Brown vs. Boorman, in error, 11 Cl. & Fin. 1.
On this subject, see an article in 1 Law Mag. N. S. 192.
In some states of America assumysit lies for taxes, 20 Amer. Jur. 6. So in our
own country an action in form ez contractu lies for money payable by act of Parliament, or a by Iaw. Com. Dig. action. assumpsit, A. 1.

